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The aim of this paper is to ascertain the limits of the violence a person waging a 
just war can conduct. To decide where the limits are set, or rather should be set, 
a discussion of just war theory is required to decide on the people that are viable 
targets for violence. Within traditional just war theory the viability of targets are 
based upon the combatant vs. non-combatant dichotomy, which in turn is based 
upon categorizations of people in either one of the sides. After a brief 
introduction into the general outlines of traditional just war theory, the 
traditional dichotomy will be presented through Michael Walzer. Walzer, in turn 
will be critically analyzed through Igor Primoratz. After the critical analysis a 
revised dichotomy based on revised categorizations will be presented. The 
proposed revision will be shown to withstand criticism through the refutation of 
the objections that Robert Sparrow sets forth. Finally, the implications for 
terrorism that the revised dichotomy and categorization hold will be discussed. 
 
I. Traditional Just War Theory 
A. General Introduction 
As a concept, just war dates back to Ancient Greece. The likes of Plato and 
Aristotle have thought and written about wars being just and moral. After 
Ancient Greece the discussion of just war ceased until the scholastic period, 
during which St. Augustine revived it. Although St. Augustine was the one to 
bring just war back into the spotlight, it can be said that St. Thomas Aquinas was 
the one that fathered Just War Theory, which is the systematic evaluation and 
discussion of the concept of just war. In his monumental work Summa Theologica 
Aquinas delves into the discussion of just war, where he writes out 7 criteria for 
a war to be just. Although there have been a plethora of works on just war theory 
after Aquinas, especially in the 20th century, most of the post-Aquinas literature 
on the subject has broadly followed the framework Aquinas created. This being 
the case, we will use Aquinas’ framework to summarize just war theory as it 
stands in the tradition, through sketching the criteria he sets forth we will set the 
terminology for the discussion ahead.  
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Aquinas’ criteria will be mentioned in name only and will be explained further in 
the pages to come. The criteria are as follows: Last resort, legitimate authority, 
just cause, probability of success, right intention, proportionality and 
discrimination. Although Aquinas unifies the criteria in one category of 
principles of just war, we will, like most contemporary discussions, discuss them 
in two categories, namely the categories of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The 
former is the criteria for the justness of the origin of a war. The latter is the 
criteria for the justness of the methods of waging of a war. 
 
B. Jus ad Bellum 
As said above, the category of jus ad bellum is concerned with the origin of a war, 
or rather how and why a war is initiated. Out of the 7 criteria for a just war 5 are 
included in the category of jus ad bellum. These 5 criteria are as follows: Last 
resort, legitimate authority, just cause, probability of success and right intention. 
In this section all 5 of the criteria will be sketched.  
 
The criterion of last resort refers to the principle that war cannot be just unless it 
is the only option left at hand. A war can only be just if all peaceful and non-
violent options were used and bore no fruits. This criterion ensures that 
warmongers cannot wage a just war and only people who have a disposition for 
peaceful resolutions can wage a just war as a final means that presents itself 
once all other possible avenues for resolution have been exhausted. 
 
The criterion of legitimate authority refers to the principle that a war cannot be 
considered just unless it is initiated and waged by a legitimate authority. What 
constitutes a legitimate authority; under what conditions a body or person 
becomes legitimate can be debated and provided with differing answers. The 
principle itself, however, is very basic and clear. Since in traditional just war 
theory war is a communal act, in the sense that individuals cannot wage war but 
only political bodies can, individuals or groups that are not representative of the 
entirety of a political body cannot claim legitimacy and therefore any war they 
wage would be unjust. This principle aims to stop multitudes of people and 
groups to utilize just war as their method for political gains, which would result 
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in mayhem. Instead the principle makes sure that only legitimate political actors 
representing political bodies can wage just war, ensuring just war remains off 
limits for most actors and that just war remains only for the legitimate sovereign 
instead of petty whims of random people and groups. 
 
The criterion of just cause refers to the principle that a war can only be just if the 
reason for initiating the war is considered just. Similar to legitimate authority, 
the contents of the predicate “just” can be discussed and is not fixed. The 
principle itself, however, is clear in a categorical manner. In the tradition the 
thing that makes a war just is if it is in response to a wrongdoing. A war for self-
defense or for retaking a previously conquered land, for example, would be just 
because it is in response to harm inflicted. However, as said above, what 
constitutes a just cause may differ from one interpretation to another. 
 
The criterion of probability of success refers to the principle that a war cannot be 
just if there is no reasonable prospect for victory. This principle aims to make 
sure that there are no just wars fought in vain, therefore ensuring that there are 
no wasteful deaths, even if the cause is just. 
 
The criterion of right intention refers to the principle that a war cannot be just 
unless the intentions of those who wage it are right, even if all the other criteria, 
such as just cause, are met. A war must be pursued and waged with the intention 
to undo the initial harm that created a just cause; it must aim to establish peace. 
If the actors waging the war are merely using the just cause for a means for an 
end other then a right one, such as establishing peace, the war at hand becomes 
unjust. 
 
C. Jus In Bello 
The two criteria remaining are included in the category of jus in bello, the 
category about the justness of the methods of waging a war. This category is 
concerned with how the actors go about waging their wars. Jus ad bellum alone 
only determines the initiation of the war as just or unjust, for a war to be truly 
just the actors waging it must adhere to principles of justice throughout the war. 
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The two criteria that must be observed are the criterions of proportionality and 
discrimination. 
 
The criterion of proportionality refers to the principle that the reaction to an 
action must be in equal strength, or not be exaggerated. The level of violence 
must not exceed, out of proportion, the violence inflicted upon oneself. Violence 
must be used surgically, so to speak, so that no more than the amount necessary 
is used. Similar to the criterion of probability of success, which aims to avoid 
wasteful death, this criterion also ensures that no more than absolutely required 
is subjected to violence. An example would be to avoid slaughtering the enemy 
auxiliary forces if they are expected to surrender once their vanguard is 
defeated. 
 
The criterion of discrimination refers to the principle that in a just war the 
dichotomy of combatant vs. non-combatant must be respected and accordingly 
only combatants must be targeted. This criterion aims to prevent the deaths of 
innocents and defenseless people. The idea is that since the combatants are 
armed and are the ones carrying out violent acts only they are viable targets 
since they pose immediate threat and have the capacity to defend themselves 
and are the responsible ones for the violence. An example of this criterion would 
be the actors waging a just war conquering a city and only killing the armed 
defensive force and not attacking the civilian populace.  
 
C.I. Combatant vs. Non-Combatant Dichotomy 
The criterion of discrimination is the most respected rule of war in 
contemporary warfare. Derived from the combatant vs. non-combatant 
dichotomy, it stands as the most absolute moral standard for warfare. This paper 
aims to undermine this dichotomy, and by implication the criterion of 
discrimination, in its current form. It will be argued that although a dichotomy 
similar to the combatant vs. non-combatant dichotomy is called for, the criterion 
at hand is both counter-intuitive and lacking in dealing with contemporary 
warfare. The next part of the paper will consist of the critical analysis of the 
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combatant vs. non-combatant dichotomy, which will be referred as the false 
dichotomy from this point on. 
 
II. The False Dichotomy 
A. Rationale of The False Dichotomy 
The false dichotomy will be analyzed and critiqued in the form that Walzer 
presents it in his monumental book Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With 
Historical Illustrations. To give an analysis and critique we must first understand 
the rationale Walzer employs to set the dichotomy up. Walzer sets up the 
dichotomy through two strands of arguments for two respective categories of 
people that can be considered viable targets for violence.  
 
The first category consists of people that are not responsible for the initial 
aggression that created the just cause for the just war at hand, but are 
nevertheless people that are the tools for the initial and following aggressions. 
This category will be called The Category of The Non-Responsible from now on. 
The second category consists of people that are responsible for the initial 
aggression that created the just cause for the just war at hand. This category will 
be called The Category of the Responsible from now on. The arguments for the 
two categories’ viability for violence will be given in the coming sections, but 
here it must be noted that Walzer takes the people in these categories to be the 
only people that are viable targets and therefore, by implication, anyone outside 
these categories are non-viable targets for violence, thus setting up the false 
dichotomy. 
 
A.I. Argument for The Category of The Non-Responsible 
Before going into the argument of how this category qualifies for viability for 
violence, let us write out the constituents of the category. There are two sub-
categories of the category. The first consists of the combatants themselves, 
namely soldiers and military personnel. The second consists of those civilian 
workers that produce supplies of war and of military nature. It is important to 
note, as mentioned above, that this category consists of people that are not 
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responsible for the war itself and thus their viability is not derived from their 
moral or political culpability at all, but rather from a practical perspective. Their 
viability is derived from the fact that they pose a threat to the attacked populace. 
 
The first sub-category, which is the category of military personnel, is made viable 
by the fact that “he (the soldier) has been made into a dangerous man” (Walzer, 
2015, p.145). It is of no consequence at this point whether the soldier had a 
limited set of options and thus was not perhaps completely free because “it is 
nevertheless accurate to say that he has allowed himself to be made into a 
dangerous man” (Walzer, 2015, p.145). Walzer allows for the targeting of 
military personnel on grounds that they pose immediate threat to the attacked 
populace and from the claim that the latter has a right to act, which is derived 
from the right to self-defense. 
 
The second sub-category, which is the category of civilian workers aiding the 
war effort, is made viable by its reduction into the first category. Here Walzer 
makes a crucial distinction between workers. He acknowledges that any product 
ranging from food to medicine, from ammunition to tents, can be used to serve 
the war effort. However, he goes on to point out that the “relevant distinction is 
not between those who work for the war effort and those who do not, but 
between those who make what soldiers need to fight and those who make what 
they need to live, like the rest of us” (Walzer, 2015, p.146).  
 
With this distinction, which is in similar nature to the argument for the first sub-
category in that it only condemns workers that work towards making soldiers 
“dangerous”, Walzer makes sure that only workers aiding in the direct increase 
of threat are viable targets. He argues that such workers are “assimilated to the 
class of soldiers”(Walzer, 2015, p.146) since they directly increase the danger 
the attacked populace faces. But it is important to note that Walzer limits the 
attacks on these workers by saying that “they can be attacked only in their 
factory, when they are actually engaged in activities threatening and harmful to 




A.II. Argument for The Category of The Responsible 
Again, before going into the arguments of why this category demands viability 
for violence, let us state the constituents of the category. This category consists 
of people that are responsible for the war itself, and thus the just cause of the 
just war at hand. They are responsible for the initial act of aggression and are 
thus effectively responsible for the resulting outbreak of continued violence, 
albeit not necessarily for the form in which the violence in question was 
executed. This idea of Walzer that certain individuals can be responsible for the 
acts of a state is seen when he claims that “acts of state are also acts of particular 
persons, and when they take the form of aggressive war, particular persons are 
criminally responsible” (Walzer, 2015, p.291). By this line of reasoning Walzer 
concludes that some people within the state apparatus are directly responsible 
for the war and thus constitute the category at hand. 
 
In trying to pin down these persons Walzer claims that it “makes sense to begin 
with the head of state (or the effective head) and the men and women 
immediately around him, who actually control the government and make key 
decisions” (Walzer, 2015, p.291). So, we can conclude that Walzer claims the 
category to consist of high political officials and anyone that has a direct effect on 
these officials or the policies themselves. 
 
At this point the reasoning for the viability of this category ought to be rather 
obvious. Walzer, in defining groups that have immunity, refers to the fact that all 
those that possess immunity have the common trait of not being “currently 
engaged in the business of war” (Walzer, 2015, p.43). From this point it follows 
that those that are engaged in the business of war forsake their immunity. We 
have seen above that those people that are not responsible for war but who are 
mere tools are considered to be engaged in the business of war. It follows that 
the actual agency that wields and commands these tools are necessarily engaged 
in the business of war and therefore forsake their immunity and are viable 




B. Critique of The False Dichotomy 
Now that an account of the False Dichotomy, as Walzer presents it, has been 
given, this chapter will give a critique of it. The critique in this chapter will be 
given with reference to Igor Primoratz’s paper Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory: 
Some Issues of Responsibility, in which he criticizes Walzer’s understanding of 
responsibility and how it contributes to what we have dubbed the false 
dichotomy. Mirroring the previous chapter, this chapter will consist of two sub-
chapters, the first for the critique of the category of the Non-Responsible and the 
second for the critique of the category of the Responsible. Although Primoratz 
criticizes both of the categories Walzer depends upon for the false dichotomy, 
the critique of the category of the non-responsible will only be briefly sketched 
since it is of no great relevance to the point of this paper, as will be explained. 
The critique of the category of the responsible, however, will be detailed as it is 
of paramount importance for the next chapters, which will write out the 
proposed dichotomy and its implications for terrorism. 
 
B.I Critique of the Walzerian Category of The Non-Responsible 
As we have seen Walzer’s category of the non-responsible consists of soldiers 
and those civilians that have been “assimilated” into the class of soldiers, which 
are workers that create products that are directly related to military efforts, such 
as weapons and ammunition. Through his critique, Primoratz’s aim is not to add 
further groups of people into the category but to challenge the claim that the 
category is of equal moral standing on both sides, namely the aggressing and 
defending sides, or rather the unjust and just sides, respectively. 
 
Since the final aim of this paper is to discuss the limitations for violence that the 
just side is required to uphold, we have not discussed until this point the 
distinction between the sides with regards to their limitations for violence. At 
this point, however, we must briefly touch upon this subject since Primoratz’s 
critique of Walzer with regards to the category of the non-responsible is 
precisely about this, namely Walzer’s claim that the people in this category on 
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both sides of the war have a moral equality, that “they (soldiers) find in each 
other moral equals” (Walzer, 2015, p.36). What Walzer argues by this point is 
that since soldiers are not responsible for the war itself but only for their own 
conducts within it, they are, unless they commit atrocities, morally equal and 
thus have an equal license to kill, which means that soldiers fighting an unjust 
war are not morally culpable anymore than those fighting a just war.  
 
Primoratz, on the other hand, argues that the excuses Walzer gives to absolve 
soldiers from any responsibility regarding jus ad bellum does not stand and thus 
those “soldiers fighting for an unjust cause and those fighting for a just one are 
not morally equal” (Primoratz, 2002, p.230) and, therefore, “the former (soldiers 
fighting for an unjust cause) have no license to kill at all” (Primoratz, 2002, 
p.230). Through this argument Primoratz effectively denies the existence of the 
category of non-responsible on the unjust side. 
 
B.II. Critique of the Walzerian Category of The Responsible 
The Walzerian category of the responsible, as seen above, consists of those 
people that are directly responsible for the war itself. These people, according to 
Walzer, are high political officials and anyone else that have direct effects on the 
governance of the country and in the specific case of war the governance of the 
war. The revision Primoratz aims at in giving his critique of Walzer is to extend 
the category of the responsible to include a portion of the civilian populace. He 
claims that with regards to responsibility for the cause of war, civilians that have 
supported and continue to support the government, which directly executed the 
policy of war, also have a share in the responsibility.  
 
The main thrust of Primoratz’s argument is that Walzer and his intellectual kin 
all “operate with too narrow an understanding of innocence” (Primoratz, 2002, 
p.236), which is an understanding that concludes “one is innocent as long as one 
performs no act of war oneself nor provides those” (Primoratz, 2002, p.236). 
Primoratz’s critique of this understanding is twofold. First he argues, “innocence 
of civilians in war shouldn’t be solely construed in terms of self-defense” 
(Primoratz, 2002, p.237). Second he argues that Walzer is holding on to an 
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outdated view of citizenship and statehood and the implicated question of 
sovereignty. Both of these lines of argument will now be detailed. 
 
With regards to sovereignty and individual responsibility Walzer argues, as we 
have seen, that the citizenry, or rather the electorate, does not share into the 
responsibility for the war. This lack of responsibility of the individual citizen 
stems from Walzer’s conception of states and governments, old and new, as 
being distant and rather alien to the electorate in that the individual citizen does 
not have the capacity to properly judge or affect them. By this line of reasoning 
Walzer confers upon governments “a kind of regal responsibility” (Walzer, 2015, 
p.301) that mirrors the situation of Feudal Europe where the peasantry had no 
say in matters of governance and thus was naturally exempt from any relevant 
responsibility. Walzer himself admits that if there were a perfect democracy, 
citizens that voted for the aggressing government would be held accountable, 
but since what we have are imperfect democracies the aforementioned 
argument of regality stands and the citizenry is spared any responsibility. 
 
Against Walzer’s account of real, contemporary states and governments 
Primoratz offers an alternative reading. He aims to position himself in the 
middle, between Walzer who absolves the majority of the citizenry of any 
relevant responsibility and Michael Green who claims “the people remain 
responsible for what the government and military does even in a tyrannical 
regime” (Primoratz, 2002, p.234). Primoratz claims that there is a nuanced view 
of responsibility and culpability in between, one that depends on the type and 
form of the state and government citizens are operating within. This view 
depends on the distinction between undemocratic and democratic states. With 
the former Primoratz “sticks to the view that preceded the French Revolution” 
(Primoratz, 2002, p.235), which is effectively what Walzer retains for every 
contemporary state. For the latter, however, the citizenry shares into the 
responsibility since “it is indeed the people who decides, while both the 




This view of contemporary democracies, Primoratz claims, is a simple logical 
conclusion of what we usually use to justify sovereignty of states and 
governments, which is individual consent and liberty to do so. Primoratz argues 
that if we “take seriously the freedom, rationality, and responsibility of human 
beings, as well as the implications of democracy, however imperfect” (Primoratz, 
2002, p.241) we arrive at the conclusion that individual citizens can be 
responsible for their states’ and governments’ actions.  
 
Having concluded that citizens that support the aggressing government are fully 
responsible for the aggression Primoratz goes on to argue against what we have 
mentioned earlier as “too narrow an understanding of innocence”, which he 
claims a number of philosophers within the tradition hold. This understanding is 
derived from, Primoratz claims, the principle of self-defense, which “entitles us 
to attack those, and only those, who are attacking us, in order to fend of their 
aggression”(Primoratz, 2002, p.236). By this understanding the attacked nation 
cannot attack the aggressing nations’ supporting civilians even if they are 
deemed responsible since they are “innocent”.  
 
But, Primoratz continues, “the self-defense view of innocence can’t be all there is 
to it” (Primoratz, 2002, p.236). He gives two hypothetical examples to better 
illustrate the counter-intuitive nature of this view. Both examples have three 
agents, A, B and C and in both, A wants to kill C. In the first, A hires B to do the 
killing and in the second, A hypnotizes B to do killing. In both cases C can either 
kill A or B to save herself. It is important to note that in both cases the original 
aggressor is A and B is only a consenting and non-consenting tool, respectively. 
Considering these two cases Primoratz argues that if we take the self-defense 
view of innocence as the sole view we cannot differentiate between the cases 
where C opted to kill B rather than A. But it is obvious that A is responsible in 
both whereas B is only responsible for the first case. Furthermore one must also 
note that if C kills B and not A in the first case, the original aggressor remains and 
thus the threat persists and the truly culpable person remains untouched. 
Therefore, Primoratz concludes, self-defense cannot be the only designator of 
innocence; the notion of responsibility also plays into it.  
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III. Revision of The False Dichotomy 
A. Proposed Dichotomy 
Having given a critical analysis of the false dichotomy as Walzer presents it, 
which, as we have seen, in practice amounts to the combatant vs. non-combatant 
distinction through the categories of the non-responsible and responsible that 
exclude all those that are not “engaged in the business of war”, which is the 
prime cause for viability for violence. Stemming from the notion of innocence 
with reference to self-defense, which has been discussed and refuted above, 
Walzer’s categories only include those that are directly involved in the war effort 
and excludes the citizenry since they are not directly involved even if they are 
supportive of the effort itself and would see it prolonged. 
 
The basis for excluding the citizen sphere from any possibility of violence has 
two levels, as we have seen, and both of these levels, namely the narrow 
understanding of innocence and the misconception of sovereignty of 
contemporary states, have been refuted. Now, based on these refutations, let us 
detail the new, proposed dichotomy, which has already been roughly sketched in 
the critique of Walzer by Primoratz. Similar to the previous chapters, this 
chapter will also lay out the proposed dichotomy in two sub-categories, namely 
the categories of the non-responsible and responsible. After the dichotomy has 
been presented, some objections to it from Robert Sparrow’s paper “Hands Up 
Who Wants to Die?”: Primoratz on Responsibility and Civilian Immunity in 
Wartime will be presented and duly responded to.  
 
A.I. The Proposed Category of The Non-Responsible 
Active military personnel and workers producing military equipment constitute 
the Walzerian counterpart of this category. Moreover, as we have seen, both the 
just and unjust sides of the war boast this category based on Walzer’s claim of 
moral equality of soldiers on both sides. Primoratz, however, refuses this 
equality by arguing that the soldiers on the unjust side are accountable to the 
war itself and their participation in it. By this refusal he concludes that the 
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soldiers on the unjust side have no license to kill and they are, in effect 
murderers. Moreover this refusal amounts to the eradication of the category of 
the non-responsible for the unjust side since this category is also held 
accountable to the initial aggression. Primoratz’s stance may be just in many 
cases but it is not hard to imagine a case where the unjust side’s soldiers are 
indeed forced against their will. By virtue of such a case it is best not to deny this 
category to the unjust side in a universal manner. 
 
With the reintroduction of the category for the unjust and aggressing side, it 
must be clear that there is, in fact, not much of a difference from the Walzerian 
counterpart of this category. Mirroring Walzer’s category, the proposed category 
also contains soldiers and military-related civilian workers. The only palpable 
difference is that the category on the unjust side is possibly fewer in numbers 
since only those soldiers and workers that are forced are now in this category, 
whereas those that have willingly joined the unjust cause are culpable and are in 
the category of the responsible.  
 
A.II. The Proposed Category of The Responsible 
The category of the responsible holds a much more crucial role in this paper 
since its revision holds practical implications that are significantly more than the 
revision in the previous category held. Where the previous category underwent a 
revision that resulted in no considerable change for the practice of just war, the 
revision in this category necessitates massive changes in the practice of just war. 
The change in question is, following Primoratz’ critique, the addition of 
supportive citizens to the category of the responsible. Where the Walzerian 
category included only high political officials and those people that have direct 
influence over the governance of war, the proposed dichotomy also includes 
citizens that support the government and people directly affecting it. The 
reasons behind this addition have been discussed in the critique of the Walzerian 
category, so there is no need to go over them in detail again.  
 
It is important, though, to specify what “supportive citizen” means. Here, let us 
turn again to Primoratz who divides the citizenry into three categories: active 
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supporters, passive supporters and opponents. Active supporters are those that 
“actively support the government and the war… vote for the ruling party, give 
allegiance to the government that is pursuing the war, express support for the 
war on appropriate occasions” (Primoratz, 2002, p.236). So anyone that desires 
the war and the government waging it and acts upon this desire is an active 
supporter who is “fully responsible for the war” (Primoratz, 2002, p.236).  
 
A passive supporter is that citizen that chooses to remain inactive, both for and 
against the war, due to indifference or to a lack of knowledge accompanied by 
indifference again or to lack of hope for change. For the cases of indifference she 
either knows the war is unjust and does not care or does not know but also does 
not care to know. In the former case she remains knowingly inactive in the face 
of injustice thus making her an accomplice if not directly responsible. In the 
latter case she is facing a situation where many are dying and suffering. The 
justness or the unjustness of this cruelty, she does not know, but she has a 
capacity to judge the situation for herself. Her failure to ascertain the nature of 
the situation is due to her indifference, which cannot be justly maintained when 
there is something she can do to prevent the cruelty at hand if she were to judge 
it unjust. So, in both cases “her refusal to be involved is tantamount to passive 
support of the government and the military” (Primoratz, 2002, p.237).  
 
The citizen who remains inactive due to her lack of belief in any change her 
actions might bring forth, also becomes a passive supporter. She is a passive 
supporter because “the imperfections of democracy are constraints on what she 
can accomplish, not excuses for doing nothing” (Primoratz, 2002, p.238). Even if 
she faces insurmountable obstacles, she can protest symbolically. In doing so she 
lets the government know that she, as a citizen of the aggressing nation, does not 
approve of the government and condones the war effort.  
 
An opponent citizen is that person that actively opposes the government. This 
opposition can take many forms ranging from voting against the aggressing 
government to public dissidence, from withholding taxes for the war effort to 
protests and marches. When a citizen voices and manifests her opposition in 
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such a manner, either with hopes of actually altering the situation or as a mere 
symbolic act, she becomes an opposition who is not included into the category of 
the responsible. She retains her immunity because she refuses to engage in war 
effort and to the contrary does all she reasonably can to stop it.  
 
In conclusion, the proposed category of the responsible brings with it the 
addition of supportive citizens, thus separating itself from the traditional 
dichotomy, which we have dubbed the false dichotomy. It is important to note, 
however, that only actively supportive citizens are to be included into the 
category. This limitation to active supporters, and the implicated exclusion of 
passive supporters, goes against Primoratz, who argues that passive supporters 
are responsible, albeit not the same degree as the active supporters, and some 
level of violence is justified. Primoratz’s position on passive supporters, 
however, is hard to retain, since the line of when and how we differentiate them 
and the level of appropriate violence that is just, are all questions that have 
ambiguous answers. Due to this ambiguity, which can admittedly be perhaps 
solved with a very detailed account that is unfortunately beyond the scope of this 
paper, the proposed category in this paper only includes actively supportive 
civilians that are clearly identifiable. 
 
A.III. Possible Objections to The Proposed Categories 
Robert Sparrow, in his paper “Hands up Who Wants to Die?”: Primoratz on 
Responsibility and Civilian Immunity in Wartime, attempts to criticize Primoratz’s 
critique of Walzer and his reformulation of the categories of viable targets. This 
chapter will aim to respond to the objections Sparrow raises against the 
reformulated dichotomy. Before moving on to the objections, however, it is 
important to note, once again, that the categories and by result the final 
dichotomy that this paper espouses are different than that of Primoratz’s. These 
differences are important by virtue of the fact that they allow the revised 
dichotomy to avoid some of Sparrow’s objections.  
 
The differences in question are, as was written above, as follows: for the category 
of the non-responsible we hold that some of the soldiers of the unjust side retain 
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their case for non-responsibility, contrary to Primoratz’s claim that all the 
soldiers are responsible for the war itself since they had a responsibility to judge 
the merits of the war and decide to join or not. The difference for the category of 
the responsible is that we take only actively supportive citizens that are 
identifiable to be in the category of the responsible, contrary to Primoratz’s claim 
that passively supportive citizens also are responsible to a certain degree. Now 
that the categories, as they are maintained in this paper, are clear, we can move 
on to responding to the objections, of which there is a total of 10. The format will 
be somewhat dialectical in that each objection will be clearly written and then 
responded to in an individual, point-by-point manner. 
 
Objection. I: Sparrow claims that Primoratz’s revision would “greatly increase 
civilian casualties in wartime” (Sparrow, 2005, p.304) due to the fact that a 
number of collateral damage is acceptable in the practice of war. Sparrow points 
out that whilst civilian casualties are rare when targeting military targets, they 
would be much more frequent if civilian targets can also be attacked. The 
example he gives is that of a settlement with %90 active supporters, which 
would constitute a legitimate military target in the revised category and thus 
condemn the remaining %10. 
 
This is a legitimate worry that helps to better the revised category and its 
implied methods of war. It can be solved with an additional clause to regulate 
military conduct when it comes to directly targeting civilians. Collateral damage 
is, unfortunately, an unavoidable result of warfare but with regards to targeting 
civilians we must add a non-flexible principle of discrimination, which effectively 
denies the justness of any collateral damage in an operation targeting civilians. 
This principle would not only allow the revised category to avoid the 
abovementioned objection but also prepares it for its implications on terrorism, 
which will be discussed further on. 
 
Objection. II: This objection is with regards to unjust aggression. Sparrow points 
out that since actively supportive civilians are in the same category with those 
directly engaged in the business of war, the unjust aggressors’ only crime in 
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killing them is her lack of license to kill with regards to anyone. By this token, 
Sparrow claims that there remains no difference of level of criminality between 
an unjust murder of a soldier and an unjust murder of an actively supportive 
civilian because the “wrong here is the war itself” (Sparrow, 2005, p.306). 
 
By this objection Sparrow aims to corner the revised categorization through a 
vague reference to our intuitions and commitment to the traditional theory. But 
it is perfectly logical, and morally sound, to “bite the bullet” and accept this point. 
Yes, there is no difference of criminality between an unjust murder of a soldier 
and a civilian because both were forced into this war through the same unjust 
aggression. 
 
Objection. III: Sparrow points to the fact that Primoratz’s revision would lead to 
the viability of people that are not citizens of the aggressing side. Since he 
includes all those individual citizens that, actively or passively, support the war 
into the category of the responsible there is no reason to stop at the citizenry. 
Anyone from around the world could be held accountable if they are actively 
supporting the war or even if they have a capacity to demand change and don’t 
act to do so. Sparrow gives the example of the U.S., since it is the closest thing in 
the world to a hegemon it has the capacity to intervene and stop wars. By this 
token Sparrow argues that Primoratz’s revised categorization would hold any 
citizen of the U.S. to be a passive supporter if she does not act to protest the war, 
which is fought in a far off land, and demand her government to stop it. This is a 
good point, especially when Sparrow combines it with the point that to avoid it 
Primoratz would have to give citizenship a primary role, thus undermining his 
own position on the primacy of the individual. 
 
However, the categorization as we hold it, namely by including only actively 
supportive citizens, avoids this problem rather easily. It is true that if we take 
passive support as a designation of criminality than the whole system would 
result in mayhem, but if we take, as we do, only active support than there is no 
problem in accepting that individuals that are not citizens can also be targeted if 
they overtly support the unjust war and are identifiable. The actively supportive 
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citizen was in the first place condemned by reference to her moral responsibility, 
the actively supportive non-citizen is also condemned by her moral 
responsibility and this constitutes no problem. 
 
Objection. IV: Sparrow claims that the citizenry is absolved of responsibility 
because “it is rare for the decision to go to war to be put before parliament, let 
alone before voters in an election” (Sparrow, 2005, p.309) and that “public 
opinion about war reflects the state’s decision to go to war rather than drives it” 
(Sparrow, 2005, p.309). 
 
The first point of this objection holds only if the voted government manipulated 
the citizenry by outright lies, and even in that case it would hold for only one 
term. So, if a government made no reference to aggressive policies during 
election but pursued them after the fact, the citizenry could be absolved for the 
aggression of that first term, but if the same government is reelected the 
citizenry would bear responsibility. The second point holds in no case since the 
citizen that falls prey to the warmongering of the executives cannot refer to her 
“weakness” or ignorance to absolve herself, as Primoratz argued, the citizen has 
a responsibility to be vary and reluctant towards wars and to ascertain their 
nature before any she takes any position towards it. 
 
Objection. V: Sparrow gives the example of a citizen who is against war but 
cannot join the protests or publicly show her opposition due to situations out of 
her control. He points to the fact that this person would be considered a passive 
supporter in Primoratz’s categorization and is a viable target for a certain level 
of violence. Sparrow, rightly so, concludes that it is clear that this person cannot 
be held accountable just due to the fact that she could not attend anti-war rallies.  
 
Sparrow is right on this point against Primoratz, however the categorization this 
paper holds, as has been pointed out, does not include passive supporters but 




Objection. VI: Sparrow argues that revised categorization condemns civilians to 
death and violence by reference to their opinions. He argues this point by 
claiming that no individual citizen directly increases the threat level against the 
attacked populace, but that all an actively supportive citizen does is develop an 
opinion of support towards the war. Sparrow complains that Primoratz’s 
account is “profoundly moralistic” (Sparrow, 2005, p.313), and claims that it 
condemns supportive citizens for their moral judgments rather than their 
actions. 
 
This objection does not hold for two reasons. First off, Primoratz accepts and 
embraces the moralism of his account when he refutes the understanding of 
innocence as solely derived from self-defense. He argues for, rather convincingly 
as was demonstrated above, that the fact that a person creates no immediate 
threat does not mean that the person is question is innocent. Secondly, the 
supportive citizens in question do not lose their immunity solely by virtue of 
their moral opinions but they lose it by virtue of the violence and destruction 
their moral opinions have propelled through their acts as citizens, namely voting 
and supporting the aggressive government. 
 
Objection. VII: Sparrow argues that the “sense of innocence Primoratz’s 
argument turns upon” (Sparrow, 2005, p.315) cannot justify the killing of 
forcefully conscripted soldiers. Here Sparrow is referring to Primoratz’s 
refutation of the understanding of innocence as it is derived from self-defense. 
 
The objection does not hold, however, because Primoratz refutes the 
understanding of innocence as it is derived from self-defense only as the sole 
understanding of innocence. He does not discard this understanding but only 
adds unto it also the understanding of innocence as it is derived from personal 
responsibility. So, Primoratz’s account would not have a problem in justifying the 
killing of forced conscripts in the same manner almost all other theories of just 
war justifies it. 
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Objection. VIII: Sparrow points to the fact that in Primoratz’s categorization it is 
individuals that are at war rather than states and argues that such a relation is 
implausible since they don’t have a relation with each other. Furthermore 
Sparrow, again, refers to individuals creating no immediate threat to each other 
to argue for the injustice of them killing each other.  
 
The second part of this objection has been answered in the previous objections 
and thus requires no further answer. The first part however demands an answer. 
Sparrow inquires into the nature of the relation between the individual citizens 
of the states at war and claims that they hold no tangible relation since “they 
couldn’t even identify each other… nor is there any attitude or emotion that any 
given individual holds towards all these other individuals” (Green, 1986, p. 121). 
This anonymity, however, does not pose an insurmountable problem. Once the 
category of the responsible includes actively supportive civilians it does not need 
to latch onto all the members immediately. The relation between the anonymous 
individuals will demand action only once both sides are revealed, which will be 
the case when an action justifiable. Until that point of diminishment of 
anonymity, the fact that the categories cannot specify their members is not 
contradictory to the existence of a warlike relation between them but only 
contradictory to the specific acts of violence targeting specific individuals, which, 
again, would cease to be a problem after the diminishment of anonymity. 
 
Objection. IX: Sparrow claims that “the state conceptually prior to its citizens” 
(Sparrow, 2005, p.316) and argues that this means that a “state represents all of 
its citizens and not just those who support its policies” (Sparrow, 2005, p.306) 
since to be a citizen an individual must first be a subject to the state. Pointing 
that this bond between citizen and state “remains intact even when they (the 
opponent citizens) disagree with a polity” (Sparrow, 2005, p.316), he goes on to 
conclude that, this being the case, when a state wages war it does so with the full 
representation of its citizenry. The final implication from this situation that 
Sparrow draws is that simple opposition within the state does not retract the 
opponent citizens representation, but if she wishes to get out of the shared 
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responsibility for the conducts of her state she must renounce her citizenship 
and leave the state (Green, 1992). 
 
The entirety of this objection relies on a fallacy of equivocation. Sparrow uses the 
word “state” to refer to both the political entity that is called a state and what we 
usually call the government, namely the executive body running the state for a 
certain amount of time. While it can be argued that the citizen is dependent upon 
the state, the same is not true for the government. On the contrary, the citizen is 
prior to the government and the latter is dependent on the former. So, to avoid 
taking responsibility for the acts of a government one need only act within the 
political realm of the state to oppose the government and its policies. Sparrow 
would be right if a state were to have unalterable policies, but that is not the case 
in modern contemporary democracies and thus is a mute point. 
 
Objection. X: The final objection that will be entertained is regarding terrorism. 
Sparrow points to the fact that in the revised categorization “a potentially broad 
range of attacks on civilian targets will cease to be ‘terrorist’ – as long as they 
target civilians who support governments who are involved in an unjust war” 
(Sparrow, 2005, p.306). He acknowledges, and rightly so, that terroristic 
methods of warfare would benefit greatly from this revised categorization since 
they would not be constrained by the practical limitations of strict 
discrimination policy, which prohibits both the targeted and collateral deaths of 
civilians other than those that actively support the government.  
 
The entire objection, or rather complaint since it holds no argumentative basis at 
all, depends upon the assumption that “terrorism” is bad, which is simply the 
result of the traditional categorization. But trying to refute the new 
categorization by referring to the traditional categorization’s results does not 
work. The entire build up of the new categorization has been through the 
refutation of the traditional categorization and therefore the new categorization 
is not bound by the traditional categorizations’ standards. The following, and 
final, chapter will further discuss the implications of the new categorization for 
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IV. The Implications For Terrorism 
What the revised categorization of the dichotomy means for terrorism will be 
explained in two parts. First part will be regarding theory, namely the fact that 
terrorism is now justifiable in a categorical manner on the theoretical level. The 
second part will be regarding the practice, or rather how the theoretical 
justification’s manifestation is limited by reality. It must be noted, however, that 
the main point is the fact that the revised categorization justifies some sorts of 
terroristic attacks.  
 
A. Justification of Terrorism 
The revised categorization includes actively supportive civilians in the category 
of the responsible, therefore making them viable targets for violence in war. 
Another important change the revision brings about is with regards to the 
understanding of the relation of war. Where the tradition holds war to be a 
relation between states, the revision puts the focus on individuals and thus 
making it theoretically possible to include groups and individuals to wage just 
war. The only obstacle in the waging of war against supportive civilians, as 
Primoratz acknowledges, is the fact that it is not easy to differentiate between 
the responsible and non-responsible civilians. At this point the admittance that 
terrorism is in an uniquely qualified position to overcome this obstacle comes 
from Sparrow, who points out that terrorism is the form of war that reaps the 
most benefit from the revision. 
 
Following this line of reasoning it is easy to see how terrorism is justified in the 
revised categorization. The reasoning can be summed as follows: when there is a 
just cause and a method that is uniquely suited to further this just cause without 
creating unjust results, then it follows that the method is also just. It must be 
noted that the revised categorization includes the non-flexible principle of 
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discrimination when it comes to targeting civilians. This principle makes sure 
that terrorism that can be justified is strictly discriminatory terrorism, which 
targets and kills only those individuals that are actively supportive of the 
government and condones the notion of acceptable level of collateral damage. 
Similar to bomber plane pilots flying low to minimize risk of collateral damage 
whilst increasing risk for destruction for themselves, the discriminatory terrorist 
also goes out of her way to make sure no collateral deaths occur, even if it means 
she risks herself in the process. 
 
B. Non-Discriminatory Terrorism 
It is crucial to understand the limits of justified terrorism, and to achieve this 
understanding it is best to turn to its negation. Where terroristic attacks against 
individuals actively supporting a government waging an unjust war are 
justifiable when they abide by the non-flexible principle of discrimination, any 
other form of terroristic attack is unjustified and amounts to murder. 
 
Let us break down the three parts required for a terroristic attack to be justified: 
response to an unjust war, sole targeting of active supporters of the aggressing 
government and strict adherence to the non-flexible principle of discrimination. 
The requirement of unjust wars can be discussed further, since one could 
possibly come up with situations other than unjust war that could demand 
violence, but for our current endeavor it is to be taken at face value. The second 
part, about the targeting of active supporters alone, amounts to the denial of 
targeting anyone other than clearly identifiable active government supporters. If 
there is doubt about the target being a supporter or not, no action can be taken, 
only and only if the identification is certain can action be taken. The last part, the 
non-flexible principle of discrimination, means that terroristic attacks cannot be 
done with accepted collateral damage. They must always aim to diminish 
collateral damage, not reduce it. Any terroristic attack that does not adhere to 





The aim of this paper was to ascertain the limits for the violence the person 
waging a just war could conduct. This question has been attempted to be 
answered through a critical discussion of Walzer, Primoratz and Sparrow that 
culminated in a revised version of the traditional dichotomy and categorization. 
The main argument of the paper was that the revised version deals with 
contemporary issues of warfare and responsibility much better than the 
traditional version. The final point has been the claim that the revised version 
justifies a specific sort of terrorism, namely strictly discriminatory terrorism, 






















-Green, M. (1992). War, Innocence, and Theories of Sovereignty. Social Theory 
and Practice, 18(1), 39-62. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract19921817 
 
-Green, T. H., Harris, P., & Morrow, J. (1986). Lectures on the principles of political 
obligation: And other writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
-Primoratz, I. (2002). Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory: Some Issues of 
Responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 5(2), 221-243.  
 
-May, L., Rovie, E., & Viner, S. (2006). The morality of war: Classical and 
contemporary readings. Upper Saddle River: N.J. 
 
-Sparrow, R. (2005). “Hands up Who Wants to Die?”: Primoratz on Responsibility 
and Civilian Immunity in Wartime. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 8(3), 299-
319. doi:10.1007/s10677-005-3599-3 
 
-Walzer, M. (2015). Just and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical 
illustrations. New York, NY: Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Books Group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
